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ABSTRACT

For approximately thirty years, the Rogers test has been used when deciding if the
junior user’s use of a trademark infringed upon the senior user’s trademark rights or
if it could be protected as artistic expression under the First Amendment. Over the
years, the Rogers test was adopted in many jurisdictions, but often with some
variations which inevitably showed that courts had not found the test to be entirely
without fault. The test has often been known to tip the scales in favor of junior users.
Nevertheless, the Rogers test had never been openly opposed until Stouffer v. National
Geographic Partners, L.L.C., where Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado revealed the flaws in the Rogers test and proposed a
new test. This article examines the newly proposed test to determine if it truly infuses
balance back into the equation.
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REPLACING THE ROGERS TEST: WILL AN INQUIRY INTO NON-ARTISTIC
MOTIVE IN SELECTING TITLES OF EXPRESSIVE WORKS REMEDY THE
POSSIBILITY OF FLAGRANT DECEPTION?
SABINA NEDKOVA
I. INTRODUCTION
For approximately thirty years, junior users have enjoyed dominance over
senior users’ trademarks in the realm of artistic expression,1 a realm that is always
expanding as courts cautiously redefine its boundaries while struggling to draw the
line between artistic expression and commercial use.2 This epic battle between senior
and junior trademark users has been raging across a multitude of circuits.3 Many
jurisdictions have struggled to balance senior users’ trademark rights against junior
user’s First Amendment4 protections of free speech. In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Judge Alex Kozinski described this clash between trademark law and constitutional
* © Sabina P. Nedkova 2021, ORCID: 0000-0001-6727-9948, Candidate for Juris Doctor,
University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, December 2022. I would like to dedicate this article and
achievement to my father, Plamen Nedkov, who is no longer with us but who has inspired me
throughout my life. I also want to express my deepest and most sincere gratitude to my brother,
Stoyan Nedkov, and my mother, Toshka Nedkova, who always support and encourage me. Finally, I
want to thank the editors of the UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law for their dedication,
guidance, and hard work.
1 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2nd Cir. 1989) (ruling in favor of the junior user of a
trademark in the title of a movie); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling in favor of a junior user of a trademark in a video game); Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that the senior user has to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the junior user used the mark in a way that was explicitly
misleading where the junior user used an almost identical mark on the same goods as sold by the
senior user and remanding the case for consideration on Rogers’ explicitly misleading prong because
the Court indicated that the senior user’s evidence was not bulletproof.); Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724
F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (affording the junior user First Amendment protection when using
James Brown’s likeness in its Madden NFL video games); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the song “Barbie Girl,” used by the junior user, did not infringe
the Barbie doll); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
497 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that the cover used for Spy Notes as a parody of Cliffs Notes did not
infringe); Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.
2017) (ruling in favor of the junior user, a television show, about a fictional record label by the name
“Empire” carrying similar name as the senior user, Empire Distribution, an actual record label).
2 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997 (recognizing movie titles as artistic expression); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc., 547 F.3d at 1100 (recognizing video games as artistic expression); Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271
(recognizing greeting cards as artistic expression); Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1196
(recognizing a television show as expressive work).
3 See William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video Games, False Association Claims, and the
“Explicitly Misleading” Use of Trademarks, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306, 310 (2017).
Courts applying the Rogers test have adopted variations of it, some affording more or less free speech
protections to junior users. Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press.”).
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protections of free speech as “Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong.”5
This contentious issue of striking the right balance and preserving free speech
has not yet reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Many circuits, including the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh, have adopted a variation of the Rogers test6 to
resolve the dispute.7 Recently, unsatisfied with the outcome of cases applying the
Rogers test, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado proposed a new test in
a 2020 decision.8 The importance of the case was not in its outcome9 nor its contribution
to a long line of cases dealing with trademark infringement in artistic works. The
significance of the case can be read in the daring words of Judge William J. Martinez,
as he took on the giant that is the Rogers test and boldly forged ahead to create
something new, he asked the question: “[I]s the Rogers test the right test?” and
answered it when stating that, “Rogers tilts too far in favor of the junior user’s First
Amendment interest.”10 Judge Martinez was asking the right question but this case
note will explore if he truly arrived at a novel solution that can serve as a replacement
for the Rogers test.
This case note will examine the District of Colorado’s proposed test and
discuss how it breaks from the Rogers thirty-year tradition, yet arrives at the same
outcome. Part II of this article will examine artistic expression within current
trademark law and the First Amendment protection of free speech, and provide an
overview of cases applying the Rogers analytical framework. Part III will explore how
the District Court of Colorado is planning to fill in the gap left by Rogers so many
years ago by its new test proposed in Stouffer v. National Geographic Partners,
L.L.C. Finally, Part IV will assess the meaning of Stouffer within the longestablished Rogers tradition and discuss the future of expressive choice.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will assess First Amendment protections of free speech within
the context of trademark infringement. It will examine what those protections are,
how they relate to trademark law, and when the need to balance the public interest
of preserving free speech against trademark protection arises.

Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. The title of an expressive work does not violate the Lanham Act “unless
the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id.
7 Rogers, 875 F.2d 994; Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir.
2000); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095;
Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012). See supra note 1.
8 Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 460 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1140 (D. Colo. 2020).
9 Stouffer, et al. v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, et al., No. 20-1208 (10th Cir. dismissed Mar. 1,
2021). The Tenth Circuit granted a stipulation to dismiss under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
42, allowing for procedural termination without judicial action. Id.
10 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
5
6
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A. First Amendment Protections of Free Speech in the Context of Artistic Expression
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”11 However, the First
Amendment affords a different degree of protection to artistic expression than it does
commercial speech.12 The Supreme Court defined “commercial speech” as “expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 13 False or
misleading commercial speech, including trademarks and advertisements, is not
protected under the First Amendment and can be regulated.14 However, just because
“the dissemination [of speech] takes place under commercial auspices” 15 does not
necessarily make it commercial speech as opposed to artistic expression. Having
defined commercial speech, there is still the question of what is considered artistic
expression.
Some works that are considered artistic are “movies, plays,
books, . . . songs,”16 video games,17 paintings,18 prints,19 greeting cards,20 and design
covers.21 Artistic works could still infringe on the rights of trademark owners because
“[p]oetic license is not without limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a
can of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.” 22 The First
Amendment could be raised as an affirmative defense in cases of alleged trademark
infringement when the underlying product is an expressive work.23

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
DAVID C. HILLIARD, JOSEPH N. WELCH, II & JANET A. MARVEL, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION DESKBOOK § 8.02 (2019).
13 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
14 DAVID C. HILLIARD, JOSEPH N. WELCH, II & JANET A. MARVEL, TRADEMARK and UNFAIR
COMPETITION DESKBOOK § 8.02 (2019).
15 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 683 F.3d at 1276 (citing Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)
(alteration in original)).
16 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
17 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1101.
18 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 683 F.3d at 1277.
19 Id.
20 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
21 Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 494.
22 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
23 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 683 F.3d at 1281. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendant had
waived his First Amendment defense in relation to “mundane products,” such as mugs and other
articles, because he had failed to timely raise the same issue on appeal and found his brief lacking in
addressing the issue or the relevant law, mainly the Rogers test, in connection to such articles. Id.
However, the Court did permit defendant to assert First Amendment affirmative defense in relation
to the use of images of the University’s football players he had taken and later used to create paintings,
prints and other forms of artistic expression, which the Court discussed separately from “mundane
articles.” Id.
11
12
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B. Trademark Law: Infringement and Artistic Expression
Trademark law protects certain types of expression as it is used in the
marketplace to identify a source of goods or services. A trademark is a word, phrase,
or symbol which is a source-identifier used to distinguish the goods of one from those
of another in the marketplace.24 One can obtain a registered trademark if the mark is
used in commerce, or the applicant has a bona fide intent to use it, and if the mark is
distinctive in order to serve its source-identifying function.25
The primary purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers in the
marketplace by avoiding consumer confusion.26 Trademark law achieves its purpose
by granting trademark owners the exclusive rights to use their trademarks and
exclude others from using them if such use will cause consumer
confusion.27 Trademark owners can bring civil action claims against alleged
infringers.28
The Lanham Act is a federal statute enacted by Congress in 1946, which serves
to protect the rights of trademark owners against the use of similar marks that are
likely to cause consumer confusion as to the source of the goods. 29 Sections 3230 and

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2020). See also Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir.
1999) (discussing the protectability of book titles as trademarks and providing additional information
about what consitutes a trademark).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2020).
26 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1095.
27 Id.
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2020).
29 See
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Lanham Act,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act (last visited Sep. 27, 2020); CORNELL LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
Trademark
Infringement,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark_infringement (last visited Sep. 27, 2020).
30 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(b) (2020). This section of the Lanham Act provides that a civil action
could be filed by:
24

(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action
by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b)
hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the
acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be
used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

[21:429:2021]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

433

43(a)31 of the Lanham Act32 allow a trademark owner to bring a civil action against
alleged trademark infringers whose product is likely to cause consumers to be
mistaken, deceived, or confused about the products’ origin, association, sponsorship, or
approval.33 A prominent question to be asked is what happens when the trademark
has been used to express an idea and has therefore transcended its commercial value?
C. The Clash between “Speech-Zilla” and “Trademark Kong”
As Mark Twain has said, “[t]he difference between the almost-right word and
the right word is really a large matter.”34 But what happens if the right word is a
trademark? Can we still use that word if someone already owns it? This is the crossing
where “Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong.”35
Well-known and famous trademarks often become a point of cultural reference
and an integral part of the “collective memory,”36 which has led to their use in
expressive works such as video games, songs, cards, and movie titles.37 “The problem

31 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2020). This section of the Lanham Act provides that a civil action could be
filed by:

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
32 See CORNELL LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Lanham Act,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act (last visited Sep. 27, 2020). The Lanham Act permits a
trademark infringement claim to either be brought for a registered trademark under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114 or unregistered trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id.
33 Parks, 329 F.3d at 445.
34 Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 (quoting J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 527 (16th ed. 1992)).
35 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
36 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972. The Tenth Circuit refered to parody as a “vital commodity in the
marketplace of ideas” because it allows the creation of new form of expression while referencing
historical ones. Id. Parody is a powerful tool to bridge the creator’s point of view on current social
norms and the historical object of his ridicule, often celebrities being the subject of the same as they
are reference points for our “common experience and a collective memory.” Id. (quoting JOHN B.
THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS
COMMUNICATION 163 (1990)).
37 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900. The Ninth Circuit provided examples of trademarks that have
become cultural expressions such as something being “the Rolls Royce of its class” implying luxury
and class, and “Band-Aid” used to reference a “quick fix.” Id. The Court went on to say that trademarks
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arises when trademarks transcend their identifying purpose . . . enter our public
discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary.”38 Trademark law does not
limit artistic expression or free communication because its purpose is solely limited to
source identification in the marketplace for the benefit of consumers. But what
happens when trademarks share the same marketplace as artistic works incorporating
them?39 The Lanham Act applies only when “the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” 40
D. Thirty Years of the Rogers Tradition
Rogers v. Grimaldi was a seminal case that arose in the Second Circuit in
1989.41 The plaintiff, Ginger Rogers, brought claims under the Lanham Act against an
Italian film producer of a fictional movie entitled “Ginger and Fred.”42 The movie was
about two cabaret dancers who became famous in Italy for imitating Ginger Rogers
and Fed Astaire.43 Given the stardom status of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire at the
time of the suit, Rogers claimed that the title of the movie would mislead consumers
to believe that she sponsored or endorsed it.44 The district court had ruled in favor of
the defendant because it found that the title was not commercial but artistic expression
deserving full First Amendment protections.45 Finding the district court’s decision to
“unduly narrow[] the scope of the Act” and “create a nearly absolutely privilege,” the
court engineered a new test, now known as the Rogers test.46
Rogers created a two-prong framework for the application of the Lanham Act
to cases of alleged trademark infringement by artistic works only if “public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” 47 The
Act will apply if: 1) the “title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever”; or 2) “the title explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the
work.”48 The Court went on to say that a title will not receive First Amendment
protection if it is explicitly misleading, even if it has minimal artistic relevance.49
Applying the two-prong test, the Second Circuit found that the movie title
“Ginger and Fred” was relevant to the underlying plot of the movie, and since there
“[o]nce imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our language and
assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.” Id.
38 Id.
39 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 997.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 996–97.
44 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996–97.
45 Id. at 997.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 999.
48 Id.
49 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. The Court summarized the achievements and shortcomings of their
newly created test as one that “insulates from restriction titles with at least minimal artistic relevance
that are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves vulnerable to claims of deception titles
that are explicitly misleading as to source or content, or that have no artistic relevance at all.” Id. at
1000.
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was no explicit indication of endorsement by Ginger Rogers, the Court ruled in favor
of defendants.50 However, finding the majority’s opinion overly expansive, in
concurrence, Judge Griesa51 identified a central flaw of the Rogers test.52 Judge Griesa
foreshadowed the inherited dilemma taunting future cases to come–what works would
be considered false but still artistically relevant?53
Following the Second Circuit’s opinion in Rogers, other circuits began adopting
the Rogers test including the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.54 Some
circuits differed in their application of the Rogers test and modified it to some degree,
but for the most part kept within the Rogers established framework.
In Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the Rogers test. The case involved an artist who created paintings and prints featuring
realistic portrayals of the University of Alabama’s football players.55 The University
brought an action under the Lanham Act.56 In finding that the artist, the junior user
in this case, had First Amendment protection over the paintings and prints, 57 the
Eleventh Circuit stated, “we have no hesitation in joining our sister circuits by holding
that we should construe the Lanham Act narrowly when deciding whether an
artistically expressive work infringes a trademark.”58
The Fifth Circuit applied the Rogers test in the 1999 case Sugar Busters L.L.C.
v. Brennan59 and in the 2000 case Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc. The
later case was between the title of POLO magazine and Ralph Lauren’s registered
Id.
Id. at 1006–07. Judge Griesa stated in relevant part that “this unique case would seem to be
an inappropriate vehicle for fashioning a general rule . . . it should be left to future courts, dealing
with real cases, to determine if there are to be exceptions to the First Amendment protection which
would seem to be generally afforded to artistically relevant titles.” Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted the Rogers test for analyzing trademark infringement in works of artistic expression but the
test was not applied consistency across all circuits. See also supra notes 3 (referencing an article which
contains a list of cases) and 7 (listing cases by circuit).
55 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 683 F.3d at 1269.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1272. In its opinion, the Court separated the articles created by the artist in two
categories: those for which the artist had a previous license agreement in place with the University of
Alabama, mainly the paintings, prints and calendars, and those for which he did not, mainly mugs.
Id. The Court later referenced mugs as “mundane products” and precluded them from First
Amendment protection because the artist did not address how such products met the two-prong Rogers
test. Id. at 1280.
58 Id. at 1278.
59 Sugar Busters L.L.C., 177 F.3d at 265–69. This is an earlier case which came out of the Fifth
Circuit in 1999 dealing with likelihood of confusion claims under § 43(a). Id. at 267. The junior and
senior users both were using the mark in titles of books and the Court evaluated likelihood of
confusion based on a two-prong test analyzing 1) if the title had acquired secondary meaning the
marketplace and 2) if defendant’s title would likely cause confusion or mislead consumres. Id. at
269. However, this case did not evaluate the §43 (a) claim under the Rogers test. Id. at 267–69. The
Court only mentioned Rogers once when stating “[i]f the title of such a single work has acquired
secondary meaning, ‘the holder of the rights to that title may prevent the use of the same or
confusingly similar titles by other authors.’” Id. at 269. (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998).
50
51
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“Polo” trademarks.60 The district court granted a permanent injunction requiring
POLO magazine to provide disclaimers denying any association with Ralph Lauren’s
brand.61 The Fifth Circuit gave its allegiance to Rogers when stating “this Circuit has
adopted the Second Circuit’s approach” but then used a likelihood of confusion test to
evaluate whether the magazine’s title was misleading.62 Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the likelihood of confusion had to be “particularly compelling” in
order for the artistic work to fall outside of First Amendment protection.63 The Court
found that the magazine’s title infringed on Ralph Lauren’s “Polo” trademarks because
the magazine fell within the senior user’s natural zone of expansion. 64 The Fifth
Circuit ruling is one of few in which the senior user’s trademark rights were found to
outweigh the junior user’s First Amendment protections.
In Parks v. LaFace Records, the Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers test in a case
about the title of the song “Rosa Parks” produced by OutKast, a hip-hop and rap
group.65 The Court found that the song had no artistic relevance to the use of the name
“Rosa Parks” in the title because the phrase “move to the back of the bus” used in the
song was in no way related to Rosa Parks or civil rights.66 The Court reversed the
decision of the lower court in favor of the junior user and declared that “the First
Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries ‘artist’ to have carte blanche when it
comes to naming and advertising his or her works, art though it may be.” 67 This
statement made by the Sixth Circuit may be the result of observation as to the line of
cases coming out of the Ninth Circuit all favoring junior users’ rights.
The Ninth Circuit tipped the scales in favor of junior users, including the
Mattel, Inc. case in 2002.68 The Court ruled that the Danish band Aqua’s song “Barbie
Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661.
Id. at 663.
62 Id. at 665.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 666. The Fifth Circuit took a different approach to Rogers than other courts by first
dismissing the first prong of the test by stating that since the products were not in direct
competition with each other, the only problem remaining was any confusion between the two as to
origin, sponsorship or approval. Id. Then, the Court proceeded to evaluate the second prong of the
Rogers test based on likelihood of confusion factors. Id. The focus was on actual confusion which the
Court found and further stated that innocent intent on the part of the junior user would not
preclude an intent to confuse consumers. Id. The Fifth Circuit discussed the notion of natural zone
of expansion when stating “[t]he danger of affiliation or sponsorship confusion increases when the
junior user’s market is one into which the senior user would naturally expand.” Id. See also Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 493 (2nd Cir. 1961) (“For we agree that plaintiff's delay
in proceeding against defendant bars plaintiff from relief so long as defendant's use of Polarad
remains as far removed from plaintiff's primary fields of activity as it has been and still is.”).
65 Parks, 329 F.3d at 442.
66 Id. at 452.
67 Id. at 447. The Court in this case gave a hypothetical example stating that if the title of the
song was “Back of the Bus,” then there would be no Lanham Act violation as the junior user would
not be taking advantage of a civil rights icon, Rosa Parks. Id. The defendants admitted that they used
the Rosa Parks title to advertise their song and album. Id. at 446. The use would be permissible under
the hypothetical but in the facts of the case, the Court found that the use of Rosa Parks’ name served
commercial purpose for enhancing the marketability of the song and increasing the scope of the
audience. Id. at 452.
68 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
60
61
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Girl”69 did not infringe70 on the trademark rights of the “glamorous, long-legged
blonde” Barbie doll.71 The Court clarified that having the trademark in the title was
not enough to be considered infringement because if so, “it would render Rogers a
nullity.”72 Continuing on this same path, in E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
ruled in favor of the producers of the Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas videogame, the
junior user.73 In applying the Rogers test, the Court said that since the “level of
relevance merely must be above zero,” the videogame was not infringing the rights of
the Play Pen strip club by its portrayal of the Pig Pen strip club in the videogame and
that no consumer would be misled to believe that the onwers of the real club were
involved in the videogame production.74 Yet again in Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., the
rights of James Brown, one of the NFL’s top fifty players of all time, were outweighed
by the First Amendment protection of EA’s NFL-centered videogame depicting his
likeness.75 The Ninth Circuit found that the videogame did not explicitly mislead,
which was required under Rogers’ second-prong.76 In Twentieth Century Fox Television
v. Empire Distribution, the Ninth Circuit extended the application of Rogers to
advertisements of a television show called “Empire” allegedly infringing the rights of
the Empire Distribution record label.77 Furthermore, in Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit showed the “full weight” of First Amendment protection when it
ruled that the senior user needed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
junior user’s use was in fact explicitly misleading, even when the junior user was
producing greeting cards containing only a “slight variation” of the senior user’s
protected trademark.78
69 Id. at 908. Each of the Aqua albums included a disclaimer saying that “Barbie Girl” was a
“social commentary [that was] not created or approved by the makers of the doll.” Id. (alteration in
original). Mattel, the producer of the doll, was highly unhappy with the disclaimer and equated it to
a “bank robber handing a note of apology.” Id.
70 Id. at 900. “[T]he trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever
the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.” Id. The Court
further stated that “[c]onsumers expect a title to communicate a message about the book or movie,
but they do not expect it to identify the publisher or producer.” Id. at 902.
71 Id. at 898.
72 Id. at 902.
73 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1097.
74 Id. at 1100–01.
75 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1239. “The Rogers test is applicable when First Amendment rights are at
their height–when expressive works are involved–so it is no surprise that the test puts such emphasis
on even the slightest artistic relevance.” Id. at 1245.
76 Id. at 1245.
77 Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1196–97. Empire Distribution record label
brough claims against the television show “Empire” for not only use of the name but also for the
promotional activities of the show. Id. The promotional activities included online ads, live events, sale
of goods and also the promotion of the music used in the show. Id. In view of that, the Court stated
that “it requires only a minor logical extension of the reasoning of Rogers to hold that works protected
under its test may be advertised and marketed by name.” Id.
78 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271. In this case the junior user was creating greeting cards similar to the
senior users’ greeting cards containing the “Honey Badger Don’t Care” trademark. Id. The junior
user’s cards, as described in the opinion, had a “slight variation of the HBDGS phrase” and yet the
Ninth Circuit did not find that the explicitly misleading Rogers prong was satisfied. Id. The Court
said that this case “demonstrates Rogers’s outer limits” but it did not go so far as to rule in favor of
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The multitude of cases forming the junior user protectionist legacy of Rogers,
led the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to ask “is the Rogers test the
right test?” in Stouffer v. National Geographic Partners, L.L.C.79
III. Stouffer v. National Geographic Partners, L.L.C.
This section will provide a detailed layout of the facts and procedural history
of the Stouffer case. Subsequently, it will discuss the newly proposed test by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado and examine how the Court applied the test
to the facts of the case.
A. Procedural History
The plaintiff in this case, Marty Stouffer and Marty Stouffer Productions, LTD
(collectively “Stouffer”), filed a claim in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado,
and the same was initially adjudicated in August of 2019. 80 The claims filed against
the defendant, National Geographic Partners, L.L.C. (“National Geographic”), were for
trademark and copyright infringement as well as unfair competition for use of trade
dress.81 National Geographic moved to dismiss the claims based on Rule 12(b)(6) 82
motion.83 The Court granted National Geographic’s motion without prejudice on the
copyright cause of action and with prejudice on the trade dress cause of action. 84 As to
the trademark infringement cause of action, the Court denied National Geographic’s
motion to dismiss and allowed the parties to amend their pleadings to have an
opportunity to argue the case under the new test the court developed for balancing
trademark rights with First Amendment protections.85
Following the Court’s ruling in the 2019 decision, Stouffer submitted an
amended complaint and National Geographic moved to dismiss once again under Rule
12(b)(6).86 This time, the Court granted National Geographic’s motion to dismiss the
case with prejudice87 stating that “the amended complaint provides only the most

plaintiff on the explicitly misleading prong. Id. at 268. The Court further elaborated on the explicitly
misleading prong stating that the junior user did not add any new artistic expression, he used the
mark in a way in which consumers could confuse it for the senior user’s, and yet the Court stated
“Gordon’s evidence is not bulletproof.” Id. at 271. The evidence was not bulletproof, the Court pointed
out, because it was a “slight variation” of the original and junior user’s website was listed on the back.
Id. Just when the scales seemed to shift in favor of the senior user, the Ninth Circuit’s comment on
the evidence pulled us back in as it showed that even under these facts there was still a chance for
the junior user to win.
79 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
80 Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
81 Id. at 1165.
82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“a party may assert the following defenses by motion . . . (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
83 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1165.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
87 Id.
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generic of accusations.”88
B. The Facts
Marty and Mark Stouffer were brothers passionate about nature and
filmmaking, so they founded Stouffer Productions. 89 After opening their production
company, the brothers created the “Wild America” series, which aired from 1982 until
1996 and was at the top 10 regularly televised documentaries on PBS. 90 The “Wild
America” series went into syndication and was popularized through streaming
platforms such as Amazon, Google, and Apple as well as through DVD sales.91 The
Stouffer brothers obtained a trademark registration for “Wild America” in 1982 but
even more than that, they developed a unique style of filming using close-ups,
time-lapses, and slow-motion to capture the beauty of nature. 92
Defendant, National Geographic, launched a television station in 2001 called
“Nat Geo TV” and a sister channel in 2010 called “Nat Geo WILD.”93 National
Geographic contacted Stouffer in 2010 and 2011 to possibly purchase their “Wild
America” film library, but such purchase was never realized.94 In November of 2010,
National Geographic contacted Stouffer to request permission to use “Wild Americans”
and “Wildest Americans” as titles for its upcoming documentaries airing on Nat Geo
TV.95 Stouffer responded to National Geographic with their concerns that the proposed
names closely resemble the Stouffer trademarks.96 Nevertheless, National Geographic
proceeded to air the following series: “Untamed Americans” (2012 series, which was
named “Wild America” abroad), “America the Wild” (2013), “Surviving Wild America”
(2014), and “America’s Wild Frontier” (2018).97
C. The Stouffer Test
Unsatisfied with the outcome shown by the thirty-year history of applying the
Rogers test, the district court asked, “is the Rogers test the right test?” and then
responded with a resounding “no.”98 The Court introduced a replacement for the
two-prong Rogers test with the following six-prong test examining: 1) whether the
junior user has added his own expressive content to the mark beyond that of the senior
user; 2) whether the marks are used by both junior and senior user for similar kinds
of goods and services; 3) whether the timing of the junior user’s use of the mark
indicates “motive to capitalize on the popularity of senior user’s mark”; 4) whether the
junior user’s use has any artistic relevance to the underlying work; 5) whether junior
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1135.
90 Id. (“PBS” refers to the Public Broadcasting Service).
91 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1135–1136.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1136.
94 Id. National Geographic declined to purchase the Stouffer library in 2010 and 2011 but
requested that it be kept apprised if it was ever sold.
95 Id.
96 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1140 (“Rogers tilts too far in favor of the junior user’s First Amendment interests.”).
88
89
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user’s statements or conducts in public are suggestive of “non-artistic motive”; and 6)
whether junior user’s statements or conducts in private are suggestive of “non-artistic
motive.”99
Applying the facts of the case to the newly proposed six-prong Stouffer test, the
district court found that “[t]he choice of a title for one’s expressive creation is an
expressive choice unto itself, including the choice of a descriptive title.” 100 The Court
considered prongs two (kinds of goods and services being used), three (timing indicative
of motive to capitalize on senior user’s popularity), and five (public statements or
conduct indicative of non-artistic motive) in Stouffer’s favor.101 Prongs one (junior user
adding expressive content beyond the original mark), four (artistic relevance to the
underlying work), and six (private statement or conduct indicative of non-artistic
motive) tipped the scales back in National Geographic’s favor. 102 Concluding its
analysis under the new test, the Court determined that the lack of specificity in
Stouffer’s allegations and proof of the current popularity of “Wild America” were
detrimental to Stouffer’s success in this action.103
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will explore the new Stouffer test in detail to determine whether
the proposed test truly brings innovation to the “Speech-Zilla meets Trademark
Kong”104 battle or simply disguises the old questions as new. Even if there is something
new in the six-prong Stouffer test, does it address the current gap?105 The answer to
that question is “no,” so this section will explore where we go from here.
A. What is New?
The Stouffer Court attempted to marry multiple different questions courts had
asked in the cases following Rogers in a union resulting in a single six-prong test.106
The test aimed to discern whether the “junior user ha[d] a genuine artistic motive for
using the senior user’s mark.”107 As tradition dictates, the Stouffer Court borrowed
something old in order to complete this union.
First, the Stouffer Court did incorporate the Rogers two-prong test into its
newly formed six-prong test.108 The Court stated that the underlying artistic relevance,
which was one of the Rogers’ prongs, should be only one of the factors examined when
Id.
Id. at 1145.
101 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1143–45.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
105 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1006–07. Judge Griesa identified that gap left by the Rogers test as those
cases of “flagrant deception” in which the title for the underlaying work will be false but still
artistically relevant. Id. Similarly, in Stouffer, Judge Martinez identified the gap as an absence of an
inquiry into artistic motive in order to determine falsehood. Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1145.
106 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
107 Id.
108 Id. One of the prongs of the Stouffer test was: “In what way is the mark artistically related to
the underlying work, service or product?” (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001).
99

100
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considering artistic motive.109 Artistic relevance was a difficult question to be
determined by courts because “incongruity, irrelevance, and randomness can
themselves be artistic choices.”110 Therefore, Stouffer does not reject Rogers but rather
dilutes it by adding additional elements, which resulted in lesser weight being awarded
to the artistic relevance prong.
Another factor of the Stouffer test that resulted from artistic relevance
considerations was the inquiry into junior user’s private statements as suggestive of
non-artistic motive.111 The Stouffer Court cited the Parks decision when posing this
inquiry.112 In Parks, the artists had admitted that they never intended for the song to
be about Rosa Parks but rather “just symbolic, meaning that we comin’ back out.” 113
Furthermore, the notion of public and private statements or actions showing
non-artistic motives have close ties with the Rogers explicitly misleading prong.
The multiple factors Stouffer included in its six-prong test are echoes of the
considerations given by the Court in Gordon in its discussion of the explicitly
misleading Rogers prong.114 In Gordon, the Ninth Circuit said that if the mark was the
“centerpiece of an expressive work itself, unadorned with any artistic contribution by
the junior user” that may show an effort to cause consumer confusion. 115 Therefore,
Stouffer’s question into additional content added by the junior user to the original mark
was born out of the Gordon decision.116
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1180. Changing the facts of Parks, the Court in Stouffer illustrated the difficulty in
determining artistic relevance. Id. The Court in Parks had to decide if the title “Rosa Parks” was
artistically relevant to the underlying work or if was used for promotional purposes only. Id. at 1174.
The Stouffer Court pointed out that in Parks, artistic relevance was based on a factual finding rather
than an objective question of law. Id. at 1178. The Court in Parks had found that the lyrics of the song,
namely the phrase “move to the back of the bus,” had no connection to the title “Rosa Parks.” Id. The
Stouffer Court criticized the Parks decision because in its view “Rogers test forced the Sixth Circuit to
hang its hat on the minimal artistic relevance prong because the explicitly misleading prong could not
apply.” Id. To emphasize the difficulty of applying the underlying artistic relatedness test, the Stouffer
Court posed the following hypothetical question: Would the title “Rosa Parks” have artistic relevance
if a jazz band created a song without the lyrics? Id. at 1179. Stouffer suggests that the new test should
be expanded to include the underlying artistic relevance test as part of determining artistic motive
but it should not be a leading or a single factor in the outcome of the decision. Id.
111 Id. at 1179.
112 Id.
113 Parks, 329 F.3d at 452.
114 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
115 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
116 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 9, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
The amici in their motion argued that the prong for additional expressive content resembles closely
the transformative test used in copyright law. Id. The amici criticized Stouffer for adding this prong
which “inappropriately imports copyright considerations into a trademark question.” Id. Copyright
law does not protect short words and phrases like trademark law does. Id. Amici also argued that this
prong is misplaced because the aim of copyright law is to foster innovation and the aim of trademark
law is to prevent consumer confusion. Id. The amici saw the Stouffer inquiry into creativity and the
artistic relatedness test (also part of the Rogers two-prong test) as creating a deep conflict between
copyright and trademark law, especially the fact that courts have to venture into determining what
level of creativity justifies use of the chosen title by the junior user. Id. at 10.
109
110
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Two other prongs of the Stouffer tests were born out of the Gordon opinion. 117
First was the inquiry into public statement or actions showing non-artistic motive,
which would include “explicitly misleading” statements, as defined before Gordon.” 118
In Gordon, the Court defined explicitly misleading as not only an “affirmative
statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement,” but also as the use of the
mark in a way that would mislead consumers as to the source of the product.119
Therefore, Stouffer’s inquiry into a junior user’s public statements was not a novelty
but a derivative prong from the Gordon’s discussion of the explicitly misleading
element of the Rogers test.
Another one of Stouffer’s prongs born out of the Gordon opinion was the inquiry
into the junior user’s timing as indicative of motive. 120 When discussing this inquiry,
the Stouffer Court cited to a page in the Gordon opinion where the facts surrounding
the timing of the infringement were discussed.121 In Gordon, the plaintiff posted the
“Honey Badger Don’t Care” video on YouTube in January 2011, which quickly went
viral.122 In the next eighteen months preceding the infringement, the plaintiff filed for
copyright registration, trademark protection, started selling branded merchandise,
and was voted one of “America’s Hottest Brands.”123 Given all of the fame surrounding
the plaintiff’s marks, the defendant could not recall how he came up with almost
identical phrasing to the plaintiff’s trademark.124 Given the way the Ninth Circuit in
Gordon presented the timing of events, it begged the question if the junior user was
trying to take advantage of the senior user’s rise in popularity.125 The Court in Gordon
never asked the question about timing because it did not configure in the Rogers
two-prong test evaluation, but the Court in Stouffer made it clear that it should be part
of the inquiry.126
Finally, the Stouffer inquiry regarding the similarity of the kind of goods or
services offered by the senior and junior users was derived from the likelihood of
confusion test.127 Early in the Stouffer opinion, the Court referred to the six-prong
likelihood of confusion test the Tenth Circuit had relied on to resolve infringement

Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
Id. at 1178–79.
119 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 269–70. Use of the trademark alone cannot satisfy the explicitly
misleading prong if consumers would not use the mark to identify the origin of the goods but if they
do, then the test may be satisfied. Id. at 270. The Ninth Circuit gave an example with a Mickey Mouse
painting containing the Disney mark at the bottom corner as the use of the mark in this case would
be relevant to the subject but still mislead consumers as to the source. Id.
120 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
121 Id. (citing Gordon, 909 F.3d at 262).
122 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 262.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 262–63. The defendant in Gordon used the phrases “Me and Honey Badger don’t give a
$#%@! Happy Birthday” and “Honey Badger Don’t give a S---” written on the inside of greeting cards.
Id. The plaintiff’s original phrases were “Honey Badger Don’t Care” (trademarked in class 16 (greeting
cards)) and “Honey Badger Don’t Give a S–.” Id. at 262. Both plaintiff and defendant were printing
the marks on greeting cards. Id.
125 Id.
126 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
127 Id.
117
118

[21:429:2021]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

443

issues dealing with consumer confusion involving non-artistic works.128 The Court
stated that the factor it added in its six-prong test was the same as the following
likelihood of confusion prong: “the relation in use and the manner of marketing
between the goods or services marketed by the competing parties.”129 Here again, the
Stouffer Court continues to borrow and merge concepts already existing in our
jurisprudence to create a patched-up test sewn together by the unifying inquiry of an
unartistic motive.
The Stouffer test is not novel because it does not offer an innovative inquiry
and original perspective to resolve the imbalance between trademark law and First
Amendment rights. The six-prong test is a result of a marriage of a multitude of
concepts and questions born out of precedent following Rogers. However, it may offer
a different perspective as it examined motive as the centerpiece of the inquiry. The
question then becomes whether an inquiry into motive is too far removed from the aims
of trademark law–to avoid consumer confusion. 130 Has Stouffer managed to resolve the
imbalance Rogers created leaning too heavily on the side of the junior user?
B. Same Old, Same Old
To answer the above question regarding whether Stouffer’s six-prong test
resolved the imbalanced scales of justice, this section will provide a look at how two
key decisions criticized by Stouffer would have been decided had the courts examined
the facts under the Stouffer test.
1. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc.
Stouffer called the Gordon opinion “analytically messy” as a result of being
“constrained by precedent” it had no power to overrule but knew would lead to unjust
results.131 Stouffer criticized Gordon for favoring the junior user given that there was
minimal artistic relevance, the mark was used by the junior user precisely in the same
manner as the senior user, and both users were using the mark in connection with
the same goods.132 The Stouffer Court stated that the “Rogers test, taken at face value,

128 Id. at 1170. The likelihood of confusion test used in the Tenth Circuit was comprised of the
following factors:

(a) the degree of similarity between the marks; (b) the intent of the alleged infringer
in adopting its mark; (c) evidence of actual confusion; (d) the relation in use and the
manner of marketing between the goods or services marketed by the competing
parties; (e) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (f) the
strength or weakness of the marks.
Id. (citing King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089–90 (10th Cir.
1999).
129 Id. (citing King of the Mountain Sports, Inc., 185 F.3d at 1089).
130 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 9, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
131 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
132 Id.
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essentially destroyed the value of Honey Badger mark.”133 The question is if the
Gordon decision would have turned out the same if the Ninth Circuit applied the
Stouffer test?
The issue raised in Gordon was that the junior user used nearly the same or a
similar mark to the senior user’s “Honey Badger Don’t Care” mark, and both were
using it on greeting cards.134 The Gordon Court followed the Rogers test and quickly
determined that given that the artistic relevance had to be merely above zero, the first
prong of Rogers was satisfied.135 Because there were no affirmative statements by the
junior user that they were purposefully trying to cause confusion in the marketplace,
the Ninth Circuit had difficulty ruling as a matter of law on the Rogers second prong.136
However, if the Stouffer test had been applied to the facts in Gordon, the Court
might have had to weigh in additional factors. There were no facts mentioned in the
Gordon opinion about public or private statements or conduct indicative of non-artistic
motive.137 However, there were facts that spoke to three of Stouffer’s prongs: 1) use of
the marks by both parties to identify the same or similar kinds of goods and services;
2) addition of expressive content by the junior user to the original trademark; and 3)
timing of use as suggestive of motive.138 The first and second prongs of the Stouffer
test, if under consideration, would weigh in favor of the senior user because, as the
Gordon Court mentions, the junior user was only using a “slight variation of the
HBDGS phrase.”139 Both the senior and junior users were using the mark in connection
with the same goods, which means that the manner of marketing the products would
be similar as well.140 Therefore, the junior user didn’t add any expressive elements and
was using the mark in an identical way and in connection to the same goods as the
senior user.
Finally, the Stouffer prong inquiring into timing would weigh in favor of the
senior user because the junior user began using the mark at a time when the senior
user’s popularity had soared and even the likes of Taylor Swift and Anderson Cooper
were using it.141 These facts would be indicative of the motive for the junior user to
ride on the fame of the senior user’s mark.
Applying the Stouffer test to the facts in Gordon, it seems that three of the
prongs would have been in favor of the senior user and three in favor of the junior
user. The prongs in favor of the senior user would have been the timing of the junior
user’s use; the absence of the additions of expressive content to the original work; the
goods at issue were the same; and were used in the same manner. The prongs in
favor of the junior user would have been those related to artistic relevance under the
above zero minimum standard required as well as the absence of public and private
statements or actions to suggest non-artistic motives. If Gordon had to be decided by
the Stouffer Court, it is not entirely clear that the decision would have been different.
Id.
Gordon, 909 F.3d at 260.
135 Id. at 268.
136 Id. at 271.
137 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
138 Id.
139 Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
140 Id. at 260.
141 Id. at 262.
133
134
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It seems that the decision would depend on the weight awarded to each prong in
relation to the others.
2. Twentieth Century Fox Television
Stouffer claimed that the rule taken from Rogers in combination with
Twentieth Century Fox Television ruling meant “that trademarks registered for
arguably artistic products and services are not worth the paper that the trademark
registration is printed on.”142 Furthermore, the Stouffer Court qualified the Court’s
interpretation of the Rogers test in Twentieth Century Fox Television as “needlessly
rigid” and unable to “account for the realities of each situation.”143 While the Stouffer
Court was quick at handing down judgments, examining the facts of Twentieth Century
Fox Television under the Stouffer test does not seem to point at a different outcome.
Twentieth Century Fox Television addressed an issue between an existing
record label company called Empire Distribution and Fox’s television show called
“Empire,” which also was centered around a music label.144 The music label, the senior
user in this case, was founded in 2010, and the junior user’s show began airing in
2015.145 Fox’s “Empire” television show released music after each episode, soundtracks
after the end of each season, hosted live performances, and sold merchandise all under
the “Empire” brand.146 The show was also marketed through media, radio, online
advertising, live events, and the sale of merchandise.147 So would the Stouffer test yield
different results than Rogers, under the facts presented in this case?
First, the Ninth Circuit in Twentieth Century Fox Television discussed the
Stouffer prong for artistic relevance and held in favor of the junior user. 148 The Court
found that a television show was an expressive work and, given that the show was set
at the Empire State Building in New York, the title “Empire” had artistic relevance. 149
The next prong, examining the addition of expressive content by the junior user
to the original work, would also favor the junior user.150 Fox created a television series
with its own original music and storyline, which constitutes expressive content. 151

Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
144 Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1195.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1196.
148 Id. at 1198.
149 Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1198.
150 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
151 Id. The plaintiff in Stouffer had acknowledged that the defendant’s series had added
expressive content but used the plaintiff’s template for making documentaries and had a similar
looking show host. Id. The Court did not consider this prong in favor of the senior user because the
template claimed by plaintiff was not protectable and was standard for the documentary industry. Id.
Furthermore, the Court said that even if there was some merit to plaintiff’s claims regarding
non-artistic motive behind the title picked by the defendant, the allegations were too generic for the
Court to find this prong in favor of plaintiff. Id. at 1144. Applying the Stouffer analysis for this prong
to the facts in Twentieth Century Fox Television, there is little doubt that the junior user would have
won on this point. Stouffer compared two similar types of television documentaries, but in Twentieth
142
143
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There is no doubt that even the Stouffer Court would have acknowledged that the
junior user had added its own original content.
The third prong, related to the similarity of the marks and the marketing
channels of both users, would have most likely resulted in a win for the senior user.
The mark “Empire” was the same mark used by the junior and senior users.152 Even
though the junior user made a television show and the senior user had a record label
company, both parties marketed through similar channels.153 Both the television show
and the record label marketed their products and services through radio, television,
live concerts, and merchandise sales.154 Therefore, if examined under the Stouffer test,
this prong might have swung in the direction of the senior user.
Stouffer’s prong concerning the timing of the junior user’s use of the mark as
indicative of intent may be held in favor of the junior user in this case. There was
nothing in the facts, as presented by the Court in Twentieth Century Fox Television,
that was indicative of the junior user trying to ride the wave of fame of the senior user’s
mark.155 Given that there was no evidence to support a showing of the junior user’s
motive, this prong may be decided in their favor.
The last two of the Stouffer prongs had to do with the public and private
statements or conduct by the junior user indicating non-artistic motives.156 In the case
of Twentieth Century Fox Television, there was no evidence of such public or private
statements or actions.157 In fact, Empire Distribution argued that the Ninth Circuit
should overrule the summary judgment granted by the court below to allow the parties
to proceed to discovery.158 The senior user hoped that discovery would reveal Fox’s
reasons for selecting the name “Empire” for their show. 159 However, the Court held
that such a finding would not be relevant to the Rogers test.160 The question is if the
Court used the Stouffer test, would it have allowed the case to proceed to discovery?
It is entirely clear that using the Stouffer test and applying the facts in
Twentieth Century Fox Television would have yielded the same result in favor of the
junior user. The junior user would win on artistic relevance, public and private
statement, timing as indicative of motive, and expressive content prongs. The senior
user would only win on the similarity of the trademarks. Absent further evidence for
public and private statements, would the Court in Stouffer allow the parties to reach
discovery? Based on the Stouffer Court’s own analysis of the private and public
statement prongs, it is unlikely.161
Century Fox Television, the comparison was of two seemingly unrelated things, a title to a show with
the name of an existing company.
152 Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1195.
153 Id. at 1195–96.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1195–1200.
156 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
157 Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1195–1200.
158 Id. at 1999.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1136. When analyzing the public statements and conduct, the
Ninth Circuit considered that the junior user used an identical trademark name, “Wild America,” as
the name of its documentary outside the United States. Id. The Court considered this fact but quickly
brushed it off as non-actionable, since it is used abroad. Id. When analyzing the private statements
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C. Going Back to the Source of the Problem
Has Stouffer changed the battle strategy when “Speech-Zilla meets Trademark
Kong?”162 The answer to that lies in what Stouffer set forth to accomplish in the first
place. The Court in Stouffer had two specific goals in mind when it formed the six-prong
test.163 First, the Court set out to create a test that would allow the parties to settle
trademark infringement disputes regarding artistic expression early on before the
onset of discovery.164 Second, the Court wanted to replace the Rogers test with a test
that would root out those parties hiding behind First Amendment rights but who held
non-artistic motives.165 Unfortunately, Stouffer failed to accomplish either of its goals.
1. Avoiding Discovery
“First Amendment-based limiting construction on the Lanham Act should
provide a test that can be applied as early as possible in the lawsuit.”166 This is what
the Stouffer Court tried to accomplish when creating its six-prong test.167 The Court
reasoned that if junior users could not resolve disputes quickly, in order to determine
if they can use a particular artistic expression, it would “unduly chill expression.”168
On the other hand, if all cases concerning artistic expression in the trademark
infringement context have to go through discovery, then the senior users could always
bring a “SLAPP” suit.169
The amici did not believe that Stouffer’s test accomplished the above goal. 170
They reasoned that “[a] standard in which motive is central cannot perform” the
function of allowing for early dismissal.171 Stouffer’s opinion does not provide a clear
standard of what kind and how much evidence is required to prove motive.172 Also,
from the above analysis of Gordon and Twentieth Century Fox Television under the
Stouffer test, it is entirely evident that the application of Stouffer would require more
prong, the Court considered the fact that the junior user sought to obtain permission from the senior
user. Id. The Court stated that such actions could be indicative of desire to avoid conflict or a desire
to take advantage of the trademark value. Id. In either case, the Court did not give much explanation
or consideration to these two prongs, although some evidence was suggestive of non-artistic motive.
Id. Given the Court’s analysis in Stouffer, it seems that absent any evidence of private and public
interest, the Court would stop the inquiry there. Therefore, it is entirely possible that if the Stouffer
Court had to analyze these two prongs given the facts in Twentieth Century Fox Television, the Court
would not have come out any different on these two issues.
162 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
163 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
164 Id. at 1140–41.
165 Id.
166 Stouffer, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1178.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. (“SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”).
170 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 6, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
171 Id. at 5.
172 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1143–45.
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evidence, especially the inquiries into the timing and private statements or conduct in
order to reveal if there is an ulterior motive to the junior user’s use of the mark. 173 The
Stouffer test does not seem to accomplish the goal of avoiding discovery and allowing
for early dismissal of cases as it sought to do.174
2. Replacing Rogers
The second goal Stouffer set out to accomplish was to replace the Rogers test
because it “tilts too far in favor of the junior user’s First Amendment interests.”175
The amici expressed its dissatisfaction with the Stouffer test because it was
“worsening the uncertainty of a multifactor test by adding deep subjectivity to the
factors.”176 Furthermore, they stated that “[a]rtistic motivation cannot be split into
true artistry on the one hand and desire to get attention on the other. Any test that
tries to do so both misdescribes how creators work and bakes incoherence into the
inquiry.”177
The Stouffer Court set out to prevent the fate that senior users had suffered
under Rogers and create something new that will again infuse balance in the scales of
justice.178 However, the application of the test to real cases may not be what Judge
Martinez originally envisioned. The Stouffer Court incorporated Rogers factors of
artistic expression and explicitly misleading overt statements.179 The inquiries into
private and public statements seem to echo the explicitly misleading prong of Rogers.
The test then dives into copyright law and likelihood of confusion with its similarity of
goods and services prong.180 With its patched-up test sewn together by the unifying
inquiry of an unartistic motive, Stouffer did not solve the problem left by the Rogers
tradition. This becomes evident as the Stouffer Court ruled in favor of the junior user
even after the Court stated that “there is evidence . . . that points toward a subjectively
un-artistic motive.”181 What Stouffer did accomplish was point out a gap182 in our
jurisprudence, which has been taken advantage of by junior users. The question
remains, what do we do now?
V. CONCLUSION
Following the Rogers opinion in 1989, circuit after circuit has struggled to
balance First Amendment rights to free speech in artistic expression with the rights of
173 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 6, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
The amici reasoned that private statements cannot possibly deceive consumers and, after all, the aims
of trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion. Id.
174 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140–41.
175 Id. at 1140.
176 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 8, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
177 Id. at 2.
178 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140–41.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1145.
182 See supra note 105.
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trademark owners to avoid confusion in the marketplace. The Rogers test provided a
safe harbor for junior users to escape liability in infringement cases brought against
them if they claimed that the use had an underlying artistic relevance. 183 For the last
thirty years, such junior users were given “carte blanche”184 because the threshold for
relevance promulgated by the Rogers test was merely above zero.185 The Stouffer Court
set out to curtail the imbalance created in favor of junior users by introducing motive
into the equation.186
Thus far, the Rogers test has been criticized by Judge Griesa, writing in
concurrence in Rogers, for offering a “cure . . . far worse than the ailment”187 and by
Judge Martinez, in Stouffer, for “tilt[ing] too far in favor of the junior user’s First
Amendment interests.”188 However, the six-prong test proposed by the Court in
Stouffer was said to focus too much on the wrong issue. 189 The Stouffer test was
criticized for focusing on the junior user’s artistic motive versus their desire to profit
off of the senior user’s goodwill and not enough on protecting consumers, which is the
aim of trademark law.190 The Stouffer test borrowed elements from Rogers, from
copyright law, and from the likelihood of confusion test used in trademark law in order
to create its six-prong test laced with subjective questions into motive, artistic
relevance, and expressive content.191 The result of infusing the test with subjective
standards is that it prevents the speedy resolution of disputes at the pre-trial stage
and therefore, may lead to the “unwarranted chilling of free expression.”192
The importance of the Stouffer opinion may not be in its substantive
contributions to our trademark jurisprudence in the form of its six-prong test, but it
asked the right question. The Stouffer Court was the first one to outright oppose the
adoption of the Rogers test and avoid creating yet another variation of it like most
other courts have previously done. Stouffer shed light on the imbalance Rogers
created and although the Court was not successful in formulating the right test to
solve this issue, it opened the conversation to what are the right questions we should
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
Parks, 329 F.3d at 447.
185 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1100 (“the level of relevance merely must be above zero.”).
186 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. The Court’s last two prongs of the six-prong test dealt with
private and public statements or actions made by the junior user showing non-artistic motive. Id.
187 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1006. In concurrence, Judge Griesa said that the circumstances of the case
should not be used by the majority to put forward such a general proposition as they have with the
Rogers test. Id.
188 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
189 Motion by Intell. Prop. Professors for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants at 10, Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic Partners, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (D. Colo. 2019).
190 Id.
191 Stouffer, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1140–41.
192 Id. National Geographic and the amici both agreed that examination into motive and intent
when examining First Amendment protections would chill free expression by making it more difficult
to dismiss the case. Id. The Stouffer Court did not provide a response to this question except by stating
that it will not adopt the Rogers test. Id. Given that the Court in Stouffer asked the question if “First
Amendment-based limiting construction on the Lanham Act lead to a test that a court may apply
before trial . . . ?,” it is curious that the Court chose not to answer that question. Id. The Court only
discussed the inability of the Rogers test to dismiss cases in the pre-trial stage and offered no further
comment on why the new six-prong test would. Id.
183
184
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be asking in order to prevent flagrant deception by junior users.
The Rogers test has been easy enough to apply but it doesn’t seem to strike
the right balance between allowing freedom of speech and artistic expression while
preserving trademark rights for senior users. When does artistic choice turn into
trademark infringement? Under Rogers, the answer to that question seems to be
closer to “never,” and it gets further away from the protections of trademark law as
courts continue to increase the number of works under the umbrella of artistic
expression. However, as Stouffer indicates there are those cases cloaked as an artistic
expression but with unartistic motive hiding underneath that exterior. There is a
need for a clear standard that allows for early dismissal as prolonged litigation can
only stifle creativity and expression. There is a need for a more balanced approach to
the conflict between Speech-Zilla and Trademark Kong, and it is long overdue that
the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on this increasingly important issue.

